Remittances have hit $33.9 billion — nineteen times what foreign investors bring, relative to the economy

Introduction

Bangladesh received US$33.9 billion in personal remittances in 2025, up from US$27.5 billion in 2024 and US$22.1 billion in 2023.¹ That is a 23% rise in one year and the largest annual total in the World Bank’s series, which begins in 1976.¹ As a share of the economy, remittances stood at 7.4% of GDP, after a low of 4.6% in 2017.²

7.4% vs 0.39%

Remittances and net foreign direct investment inflows, as a share of GDP, Bangladesh, 2025.

Over the same year, net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) were only 0.39% of GDP.³ Relative to the size of the economy, then, migrant workers’ transfers were about 19 times as large as the money foreign companies put in. This article sets out how that gap opened, how Bangladesh compares with its South Asian neighbours, and what it means for policy. It uses balance-of-payments data compiled by the IMF and World Bank; these describe the size of flows, not their causes, and we avoid attributing causes the sources do not.

A record in dollars, but not in share of GDP

In dollar terms the growth has been long and large. Remittances were US$2.0 billion in 2000 and US$4.3 billion in 2005, passed US$10 billion in 2009, and reached US$14.1 billion in 2012.¹ The 2025 figure is more than seventeen times the 2000 level.¹

The path was not smooth. After US$15.3 billion in 2015, receipts fell to US$13.6 billion in 2016 and US$13.5 billion in 2017, a drop of about 12% over two years.¹ They then recovered, reaching US$21.8 billion in 2020, US$22.1 billion in 2023, and US$27.5 billion in 2024, before the jump to US$33.9 billion in 2025.¹ The 2025 total is two and a half times the 2017 trough.¹

Measured against the economy, the picture is different. Remittances peaked at 10.6% of GDP in 2012, fell to 4.6% in 2017, stayed near 5% through 2023 (5.1%), and rose to 6.1% in 2024 and 7.4% in 2025.² That the dollar total in 2025 is well above 2012’s while the share is still lower simply reflects a larger economy. The ratio can move because either the numerator or denominator changes, so it should not be read as a measure of how many workers are abroad or how much each sends.

The investment that did not follow

Foreign direct investment tells a very different story. Net FDI inflows were 0.5% of GDP in 2000, climbed to 1.2% in 2005 and 1.4% in 2015, and peaked at 1.74% of GDP in 2013.³ They then fell to 0.41% in 2020 and 0.34% in 2023, and were 0.28% in 2024 and 0.39% in 2025.³

So while remittances grew in dollars, FDI shrank in relation to the economy: in 2012 remittances were about nine times FDI (10.6% against 1.2% of GDP), and in 2025 about nineteen times (7.4% against 0.39%).²³ Remittances and FDI are different kinds of money. Remittances go to households, which spend or save them; FDI is invested in firms, with the potential to create jobs and transfer technology. The data here show only that the second has weakened sharply while the first has recovered. They do not show that one displaced the other.

A companion DEEPLAB analysis of growth and investment found that growth, domestic investment and foreign investment all weakened together after 2019. Remittances are one of the few external inflows that moved the other way.

A regional comparison

Bangladesh is not the most remittance-dependent country in the region. Nepal’s remittances were 32.3% of GDP in 2025, up from 27.6% in 2015, and Pakistan’s rose from 6.4% to 9.9% over the decade.² Bangladesh’s share was 7.8% in 2015 and 7.4% in 2025, close to Sri Lanka’s 8.2% and 7.6%.² India, with the largest dollar inflow in the region, received 3.8% of GDP in 2025, against 3.3% in 2015.²

In dollars, India received US$150.7 billion in 2025, Pakistan US$40.5 billion, Bangladesh US$33.9 billion, Nepal US$14.7 billion and Sri Lanka US$8.3 billion.¹

Two points follow. First, the 2025 surge has taken Bangladesh’s share back toward its 2015 level rather than to a new high, so the exposure is large but not unusual in the region. Second, even among the most remittance-reliant economies, FDI is small: net FDI was 0.45% of GDP in Pakistan, 0.10% in Nepal and 0.39% in Bangladesh in 2025, against 1.03% in India and 0.96% in Sri Lanka.³

Why the composition matters

Because remittances arrive as transfers to families, they support consumption and household budgets. The same flows also supply foreign currency to the economy. A country that finances its external accounts mainly through worker transfers is exposed to conditions it does not control: labour demand and wages in the destination countries, migration rules, and the share of transfers that moves through formal channels. The balance-of-payments data record the formal flows; they do not measure money sent through informal routes.

The 2016–2017 dip is a reminder that receipts can fall for several years running. Nothing in the sources cited here explains why, and we do not speculate.

What it will take

• Lower the cost of sending and receiving money. Cheaper, faster and more reliable formal transfer channels keep more of each worker’s earnings with their family and bring more of the flow into the recorded economy.
• Protect workers abroad. Pre-departure training, regulated recruitment costs and consular support safeguard the earnings behind the headline figure and the workers who generate it.
• Turn household transfers into productive use. Savings, financial inclusion and small-business finance can help recipient families invest as well as spend. Only 33% of women had a financial account in 2024, against 54% of men, so access is itself a constraint.⁴
• Rebuild the investment climate. With net FDI at 0.39% of GDP, the country cannot assume remittances will substitute for investment that creates jobs at home. Policy and regulatory predictability, trade logistics and energy reliability are the usual levers.
• Track the data. Publishing remittances by source country, channel and use would let analysts separate demand-driven growth from changes in how money is routed.